Partisans and sabotages are the latest threats to Putin’s war machine

Partisans inside Russia, insider intelligence leaks, and volunteers fighting for Kyiv are the keys for hurting the Kremlin

The current Russian government is confidently and purposefully turning Russia into the USSR 2.0. 
Total censorship, elimination of Russian opposition leaders, persecution of human rights activists, free journalists and public figures, prohibition of criticism of the government, especially the war of aggression in Ukraine – all this makes democratic ways of changing the government in the Kremlin virtually impossible. They are already working on a possible successor who would satisfy all groups of influence, so even in the event of Putin’s sudden death, without other additional factors and changes within Russia, we should not expect a change in this regime.
At the same time, Russian political opposition forces are not consolidated, do not have a single strong leader, and have no influence on changing the situation in the country. The Kremlin is well aware of this, having agreed to a prisoner exchange with the United States on 1 August 2024. In addition, Moscow is behaving extremely aggressively not only in the war with Kyiv but also threatens the West: analysts and defense ministries of Nato member states are increasingly talking about Russia’s readiness for new wars in the coming years.
Under these circumstances, the activities of partisans inside the Russian Federation, the recruitment of law enforcement officers and the activities of Russian volunteer formations fighting for Ukraine are not just demonstrative processes. They have real results that contribute both to the reduction of Russia’s military potential (and thus to the victory of Ukraine and peace in Europe) and to laying the groundwork for further changes in Russia itself. For it is the army and other security agencies (Rosgvardia and FSB, etc.) that form the backbone of the Russian authoritarian regime.
It appears that the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine also relies on these processes. Information about repeated sabotage and special operations in various parts of Russia suggests that the DIU has a network of agents in the armed forces and other security and government agencies of the Russian Federation.
For example, in 2023 it became known that a career Russian military officer, Danil Alfyorov, was recruited by the Ukrainian intelligence service and convinced 11 Russian military personnel to surrender to the armed forces of Ukraine. And in August 2024, as a result of a successful operation called “Reeds”, the headquarters of enemy officers was blown up, and the perpetrator of the operation, a Russian military officer, later defected to the side of Ukraine. The media also reported various sabotage activities in Russia, including railroad sabotage and the blowing up of bridges used to transport military cargo.
On April 8, 2024, the DIU announced sabotage on board the Russian small missile ship Serpukhov of project 21631 “Buyan-M”, which destroyed communications and automation equipment. The ship, a carrier of Kinzhal and Oniks cruise missiles, was at the Russian naval base in Baltiysk, Kaliningrad region, and, according to the DIU, could have been redeployed to reinforce the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The details of the operation were kept secret for several months, and only in July, during a press conference, were the details revealed. The explosion on the ship was carried out by a former Russian sailor of the Russian Baltic Fleet, pseudonym Goga, who had access to state secrets. 
Goga has Ukrainian roots. After the start of the full-scale invasion, he tried to terminate his contract with the Russian army, including through the courts but was not released. In 2023, the sailor contacted the Ukrainian project “I Want to Live”, which offered him cooperation. During this time, Goga collected and transmitted important information to Ukraine, and being threatened with exposure, the sailor set off a bomb on the ship and escaped from it with secret data on the state of the Russian naval complex. The DIU managed to smuggle the man across the border into Ukraine, where he joined the volunteer unit Freedom of Russia Legion (FRL) and plans to continue fighting Putin’s regime with weapons in hand.
In addition to the FRL, two other volunteer units formed by Russians are fighting on the Ukrainian side – the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC) and the Siberian Battalion. All of them have become known for raids on Russian territory. Moscow is trying to position them as traitors to the motherland, demanding punishment and calling them terrorists. Still, the Kremlin also speaks of the Ukrainian armed forces in this way. The Russian volunteers seem to see no other effective way to fight, calling it “Russia’s special liberation operation against Putin” and calling on other Russians to join them. The DIU stated that the intelligence services support these volunteer formations because they are helping Ukraine in its struggle, and a source in the agency called the Russian volunteers “the only real Russian opposition”.
In general, the facts of the presence of Russians in the DFU and the recruitment of Russian military personnel by Ukrainian intelligence not only undermine the Russian propaganda thesis of Nazism in Ukraine, but also set an example for other Russian military personnel who disagree with the Kremlin’s actions. These factors, as well as the commission of war crimes on the territory of Ukraine, despite Moscow’s attempts to absolve itself of responsibility on the one hand and to show that the killing of Ukrainian civilians was not an accident on the other, have already had consequences.
Thus, after the Russian missile attack on the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in Kyiv on July 8, 2024, one of the pilots of the 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division, the 06987th military unit based at the Engels airfield (Saratov region, Russia), contacted the DIU chatbot. The pilot was shocked by another attack on civilians, so he handed over documents from the personal files of senior officers of the division and valuable sealed materials to the Ukrainian side.
Perhaps, there will be more such cases, and more Russians fighting on the side of Ukraine. For now, it is precisely this kind of opposition to the Kremlin that is producing real, measurable results that affect Russia’s military potential and the course of the biggest war since World War II. It is on this opposition that Ukraine’s partners should rely.
Serhii Kuzan is a former adviser to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine